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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION ON INDIVIDUATING
PROCESSES IN IMPRESSION FORMATION
FEBRUARY 1989
JANET B. RUSCHER. B.A., NAZARETH COLLEGE OF ROCHESTER
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Susan T. Fiske
Two experiments investigated the extent to wi^ich competitively
interdependent individuals attend to opponent attributes that are
inconsistent or consistent with their expectations. Competitors were
predicted to increase attention to expectancy- 1 neons i stent attributes
that could potentially enhance prediction of their opponent's
behavior. Because such information is novel and unexpected, it can
lead individuals to make inferences about a person's underlying
disposition, which again potentially enhances perceptions of
prediction. In contrast, expectancy-consistent attributes are
essentially redundant with the expectancy, and offer little to
competitors in this regard. As a result of attending to expectancy-
Inconsistent attributes, and incorporating them into impressions,
competitors were therefore expected to form impressions based less on
prior expectancies and more on the attribute information available.
In each experiment, subjects expected to compete or not compete
with a fictitious fellow subject who was portrayed as competent or
incompetent at performing a creative task. Subjects commented Into a
tape-recorder about the fictitious person's attributes, some of which
were inconsistent and some of which were consistent with prior
IV
expectations. ,n Experiment 2. subjects also read about some
attributes of the fictitious person that were irrelevant to the task.
Results Of both experiments supported predictions; relative to
noncompetitors. competitors increased attention to expectancy-
inconsistent information. Moreover, when commenting about
inconsistent information, competitors drew more d i spos i t iona
I
inferences than did noncompetitors. suggesting that competitors'
increased attention was indeed for the purpose of increasing
perceptions of prediction and control. Finally, competitors'
resulting impressions of the target person were more varied than
noncompetitors' impressions, indicating that their impress Ions were
based less on prior expectancies and more on the attributes.
Findings are discussed in terms of the differences between
intergroup and interpersonal competition, as well as the general
implications of Interpersonal competition for undercutting expectancy-
based Impressions in favor of more attribute-based impressions.
V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
. .
Page
Ml
ABSTRACT
Iv
LIST OF TABLES.
.
.
.
vll
LIST OF FIGURES ....
VIM
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION
. .
.
1
Competition Between Groups
Interdependence ^
Attention to Inconsistent Information!
.
. .
. . 4Inferences about Opponent's Disposition!
.
.
. 5Uncertainty and Perceived Control,
.
. .
«
Negative Affect and Competition.
2. EXPERIMENT 1
12
Method
Results
15Summary and Conclusions 20
3. EXPERIMENT 2
Method
22
Results
. . 30
4. DISCUSSION 3g
Expectancy-based to Attr 1 bute-based Impressions 39
Intergroup Versus Interpersonal Competition
! 41
Task-Relevancy of Information Attended
. . 44
APPENDICES
A. Stimuli for Experiment 1 47
B. Stimuli for Experiment 2 48
ENDNOTES 49
BIBLIOGRAPHY 50
VI
LIST OF TABLES
Content Categories for Comments About Target's Attributes
. . ^
vi i
LIST OF FIGURES
Competitors' and Noncompet
I
tors
' Attention to Inconsistent
^
and Consistent Information ^^unbi i i
22
Dispositional Inferences about Consistent and Inconsistentinformation Made by High- and Low-Confidence Compel osndNoncompet i tors . . h^>.i>.^i5. dnu
24
Competitors' and Noncompet i tors
' Attention to and Dispositional
nferences about Inconsistent, Consistent, and Task- i r re I evantInformation
37
vi i i
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Most Of us can recollect, at least once In our lives, sizing up
and being sized up by a rival with whom we competed. in various
domains, people are frequently enjoined to know their opponents well,
by appraising strengths, weaknesses, and strategies. indeed, media
hype on this phenomenon abounds. Witness the extensive media coverage
of two top Olympic contenders. On an intuitive level, and from our
own experience, we find it inconceivable that their impressions could
be based simply on national stereotypes; if anything, we expect
competitors' impressions to be extremely idiosyncratic as a result of
having regarded each other so intently. While sizing up the
opposition seems almost too obvious on the intuitive level, research
on competition paints a markedly different picture of the impressions
competitors likely form about one another.
Competition Between Groups
Abundant research (e.g. regarding school desegregation) has
demonstrated that, when certain conditions are met, cooperative
interactions between groups and between individuals result in more
positive, mutually beneficial contact than result from nondependent or
competitive encounters (see Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Katz, 1976;
Johnson & Johnson, 1975; Turner & Giles. 1981 for reviews).' Rather
than perceiving individuals as simply members of the category to which
they belong, cooperating individuals come to appreciate out-group
members as unique individuals.' As a consequence of cooperative
contact, out-group members are chosen as playmates (Johnson, Johnson,
1
& Maruyama. 1984). and are construed as more similar to the self
drew, 1986).
in sharp contrast, competition apparently enhances the use of
stereotypes, and promotes mutual distrust. For example, the classic
Robber's Cave experiment (Sherif. Harvey, White. Hood, & Sherif, 1961)
demonstrated that competition prompted stereotyping of the out-group,
and led to the perception of out-group members as homogeneous and
unlikable. Similarly, when different groups are exposed to each other
naturally, competition has comparable effects. For example, in
classrooms composed of several ethnic groups, or comprising both
handicapped and non-handicapped students, Johnson et al. (1984) found
that fewer cross-ethnic and cross-handicapped interactions occurred at
free time when competitive rather than nondependent or cooperative
goal structures were in effect. These findings imply that individuals
In competitive situations regard those with whom they avoid
Interaction as members of an out-group, who conform to a particular
stereotype. That is, competitive goal structures apparently inhibit
people from perceiving others as individuals, but instead facilitate
the perception of others as members of a category.
How can the contradiction between our common-sense experience of
sizing up competitors as individuals and the desegregation research
implying stereotyping is encouraged by competitive contact be
resolved? Rather than striving to know the opposition well by forming
idiosyncratic impressions, people in competition seem to use prior
expectancies and stereotypes to understand their opponents. Even
within the empirical literature, there are apparent contradictions.
In a recent study, Judd and Park (1988) discovered that competing
individuals consider out-group members to be more homogeneous than in-
group members, confirming the contact literature. However, they also
found that memory recall for specific out-group members is remarkably
good. Of course, memory for idiosyncratic information does not
establish that individuals formed nonstereotyp
i ca I impressions;
subjects may have simply attended to and recalled information
consistent with their expectations (cf. Snyder & Uranowitz. 1978).
Still, insofar as individuals retained some idiosyncratic information
about out-group members in memory, Judd and Park's findings suggest
that individuals at least attend to people with whom they are
competing, and therefore have the potential to form individuated
impress ions
.
I nterdependence
Competitors' potential to form individuated impressions of one
another likely stems from their interdependence upon each other.
Competitors' outcomes are interlinked such that the two competitors'
goal attainments are negatively correlated; the success of one
necessitates the failure of the other (Deutsch, 1973). When
interdependent on another person, individuals will increase attention
to the other's attributes that contain potentially individuating
information (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). By so
doing, individuals tend away from impressions based primarily on their
prior expectancies; instead their impressions reflect the other's
attributes (Fiske & Neuberg, in press). In contrast, in nondependent
situations, when the other person is of little motivational relevance,
a prior expectancy generally serves as the primary basis for
perceivers' impressions of the other person, rather than that person's
individual attributes (Fiske & Neuberg, in press). Fro. the stance of
interdependence theory (Kelley & ihibaut, 1978). then, competitors
Should not base their impressions on prior expectancies, which is
exactly what research on group competition insists they do.
One resolution of the seeming contradiction between the contact
literature and the predictions of Interdependence theory is that
perhaps competition per se does not encourage expectancy-based
impressions, but rather competition between groups. Although
cooperative interdependence between individuals and between groups
facilitates individuation, and although competition between groups
apparently promotes stereotyping, the extent to which members of a
competing dyad adhere to prior expectancies rather than individuating
each other remains an empirical question, it is this question that
the current Investigation is designed to address, if members of a
competing dyad attend to each other's individual attributes,
integrating this information into their initial expectancies, they
cease to base their impressions mainly on those expectancies. This
investigation focuses primarily on the means by which competitors'
Individuated impressions may form (i.e. attention), and secondarily
considers a subsequent outcome of attention (i.e. resulting
impress ions)
.
Attention to Inconsistent Information
Across a variety of situations, interdependent individuals are
known to increase attention to one another (Berscheid, Graziano,
Monson. & Dermer
.
1976; Erber & Fiske. 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987).
Such attention makes Individuation possible (Fiske & Neuberg, in
press). However, what do individuals hope to gain by attention? To
the extent that individuals seek to predict and contro. their outco.es
(Kelly. 1955). interdependent Individuals should be motivated to seize
opportunities that potentially maximize their ability to do so. To a
certain degree, an interdependent person's likelihood of success
depends upon the other person's characteristics, idiosyncracies. and
behaviors. For interdependent individuals, then, attention to one
another's individual attributes is a viable way to Increase a sense of
prediction and control in the situation.
Increased attention across the board would hardly be adaptive;
more likely, competitors selectively choose among various types of
information. Investigating this in a cooperatively interdependent
situation. Erber and Flske (1984) demonstrated that although
Interdependent and nondependent individuals paid equal attention to
Information consistent with a prior expectancy, the interdependent
subjects paid significantly more attention to Inconsistent
Information. Cooperatively interdependent i nd i v I dua I s apparent 1 y d I
d
not use their expectations as the primary bases for their Impressions,
but rather sought to integrate the available Information, even
contradictory information.
Inferences about Opponent's Disposition
Like cooperators, competitors' efforts to increase prediction and
control would best be served by attending to information contradictory
to their Initial expectations. Consistent information, largely
redundant with an expectation, offers little new Information about a
target person's Intentions, disposition, or future behavior.
Inconsistent information, on the other hand, provides novel
information about the target person. Indeed, an unexpected behavior
or attribute may lead Individuals to conclude that such a behavior or
attribute Is characteristic of the target (Jones & Davis. 1965).
thereby Increasing their sense of accurately predicting the other's
behav lor
.
Interdependent individuals apparently do make such dispositional
inferences about their companion, as Erber and Fiske (1984)
demonstrated by tape-recording subjects' comments about their
partners' attributes. While considering inconsistent attribute
information, cooperatively Interdependent subjects commented about
their partners' dispositions more often than did nondependent
subjects. Because dispositional Inferences can augment the perceived
control of competitors as well as cooperators, competitively
Interdependent Individuals conceivably would exhibit a similar pattern
of dispositional Inferences.
In competitors' attempts to uncover an opponent's personality,
their Inferences about that opponent's disposition may either
challenge or re-confirm initial expectations. Because ambiguous
attributes may assume several shades of meanings, competitors'
Inferences might entail meaning change. For Instance, confronting the
Inconsistency that an incompetent opponent "attends to details,"
competitors could conclude the opponent Is a "picky" person. Not only
does this inference color the meaning of the attribute, the inference
endeavors to fit the attribute to the original expectancy.
Alternatively, competitors might conclude that an opponent is
"generally thorough in her undertakings," making an inference
inconsistent with the initial expectancy.
6
The prediction that competitors will make Inferences about their
opponents' attributes have parallel predictions In the research area
of attitudes and persuasion. Petty and Cacloppo's Elaboration
Likelihood Model (1986) predicts that Individuals who are deeply
involved in an Issue will elaborate about persuasive messages, and
will generate supporting arguments or counterarguments to them. As a
result, individuals' Initial attitudes may change, although this may
occur in either direction. in contrast, less Involved Individuals are
neither likely to elaborate about a message nor likely to evidence
enduring attitude change.
By analogy, competitors, who are more deeply Involved than
nondependent Individuals, may elaborate about their opponents'
attributes. Moreover, like Individuals involved in an issue,
competitors are motivated to be accurate In their assessments.
Elaboration about opponents' attributes, especially their relationship
to opponents' disposition, is tantamount to generating miniature
arguments that decide how each attribute supports or contradicts
initial expectations of what the other person is like. And. as a
result of thoroughly considering their opponent's attributes,
competitors' Impressions can change from those based on prior
expectancies to more complex Impressions. in contrast, less Involved,
nondependent individuals would be unlikely to elaborate about a target
person's attributes and disposition, and therefore would maintain
the 1 r expectat 1 ons
.
As a result of attending to Information about their opponents,
competitors may modify their initial impressions, but they need not
abandon prior expectancies entirely. Instead, competitors should rely
less heavily upon expectancies in forming Impressions. On the
average, competitors' impressions may tend toward the individuating
end Of a continuum ranging from purely expectancy-based impressions to
Individuated impressions created by piecemeal integration of
Individual attributes (Fiske & Neuberg. in press; cf. Brewer. 1988).
Even so. the resulting impressions of individual competitors should
vary considerably. As a consequence of attention and mental
deliberation, some competitors' impress ions wi 1 I change little while
other competitors will reject the expectancy altogether. m contrast,
the impressions of nondependent individuals should be relatively
homogenous. Insofar as they merely retain their prior expectancies.
This dissimilarity should be reflected in different degrees of
variability in the resulting impressions formed by competitors and
noncompet i tor s
.
Uncertainty and Perceived Control
If attention to and dispositional Inferences about opponents are
essentially adaptive strategies, competitors should employ these
strategies only when It Is fruitful to do so. When the outcome of a
competition is virtually determined, sizing up an opponent (or the
failure to do so) would hardly enhance perceived prediction and
control. Attention to an opponent would therefore be diminished in
conditions of relative certainty.
The magnitude of outcome certainty would in part be influenced by
the relative competence of the competitors, and also by external
constraints, such as the particular rules of a game. For example, a
competent individual would not ordinarily attend to an extremely
incompetent opponent and vice versa; it is fairly clear to each
8
competitor who will emerge as victor. ,f. however, the competent
competitor sports a handicap, or the incompetent competitor has the
benefit of a "head start." the outcome becomes iess certain. in this
case, at least for the competent competitor, attention to the opponent
might enhance perceived prediction and control.
In Experiment 1, subjects' perceived competence in performing a
particular task is assessed, and is used to separate subjects into
high- and low-confidence groups. in addition, competitors are
required to generate a large point gap between themselves and their
opponent. For low-confidence subjects, winning the prize is virtually
Impossible. Low-confidence, unskilled individuals tend to withdraw
psychologically from competitive situations (Johnson & Johnson. 1975;
Schmltt. 1986). and thus would be unlikely to anticipate winning, even
when competing against an incompetent opponent.
In contrast, Individuals who feel proficient at a task often
welcome competition (Michaels, 1977), tending to believe that they
have a chance of winning. Even if their opponent is also competent,
generating a point gap may be construed as possible. And, of course,
the need to generate a point gap makes the outcome of a competition
with an Incompetent opponent uncertain. in sum, because losing the
prize is fairly certain for low-confidence competitors, attention to
opponents would be a vain endeavor. Therefore low-confidence
competitors should not bother attempting to reconcile inconsistencies.
For high-confidence competitors, however, success or failure should be
sufficiently uncertain to warrant attention to and dispositional
inferences about their opponent, especially his or her expectancy-
Inconsistent attributes.
9
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Of course in Experiment 1. the extent to which an outcome is
uncertain depends in part on subject-confidence; interpretations of
the results are therefore potential iy limited by pre-existing
differences among subjects. in Experiment 2. subject-confidence is
manipulated so that the outcome of the competition is an uncertainty
for all competitors. After subjects are led to believe that their
ability at a task is average, they are asked to compete against a
slightly superior or slightly inferior opponent. Given the
uncertainty of a "close race," competitors in Experiment 2 are
expected to attend to and make dispositional inferences about
expectancy-inconsistent informat Ion.
Negative Affect and Competition
One fundamental similarity between previous research on
competition and the present investigation is that competition by
nature interferes rather than facilitates goals (Deutsch, 1973; Kelley
& Thibaut, 1978). The goal attainments of two opponents are clearly
incompatible, whether those opponents are groups or individuals.
Consequently, competition incites hostility, mutual distrust, and
negative affect as each competitor's goals are thwarted by the
behaviors and capabilities of the other competitor. Numerous studies
have demonstrated that cooperative group interdependence promotes
positive affect between groups, whereas competitive group
interdependence incites hostile behaviors (Amir, 1976; Johnson &
Johnson, 1975; see also Turner & Giles, 1981, for review). Because
Interfering behaviors and Incompatible goals exist In dyadic
competition as well as in groups, competitors may experience negative
affect regarding each other.
10
Thus by dint of the competitive interaction, it is improbable
that competitors would report i iking their opponents. indeed,
competitors may wish to beiieve information about their opponents-
negative attributes while simultaneously desiring to minimize the
importance of their opponents' more positive attributes. in so doing,
competitors could attempt to bolster and protect their own self-
esteem. Unfortunately, such efforts are often incompatible with
forming accurate impressions. To the extent that they seek to
Increase their prediction of the situation, competitors should try to
accurately assess all relevant information, rather than integrating
only what they wish to believe.
However, if competitors could satisfactorily maintain their self-
esteem without sacrificing accuracy, they would likely do so. Because
an opponent's attributes that are irrelevant to the particular task
are less useful in increasing a competitor's prediction and control of
the situation, accuracy about such attributes would be considerably
less important. Task-irrelevant attributes could therefore afford
competitors the chance to derogate their opponents and vent hostility,
without sacrificing accuracy. In Experiment 2. competitors' use of
task-Irrelevant information is assessed to address this possibility.
11
CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Over V i ew
An experimenter led subjects to believe that they would or would
not compete with a fictitious other subject for a chance to win a
prize. The other subject was initially portrayed as competent at the
task (positive expectation) or incompetent at the task (negative
expectation). Subjects then received both expectancy-consistent and
expectancy-inconsistent information about the other subject, and
voiced their reactions to that information into a tape recorder.
Prior to the manipulations, a self-report measure of the subjects' own
perceived competence at the task designated individuals as high- and
low-confidence subjects.
Subjects
Thirty-three female and 17 male undergraduates at the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst received credit in a psychology course for
their participation. The data of 6 subjects who volunteered suspicion
about the alleged other subject were deleted from the analyses, as
were the data of one woman who did not comprehend English well enough
to follow instructions.^ After these deletions, the proportion of
males to females was approximately equal across conditions. No
significant sex differences were detected.
Procedure
When subjects arrived, the experimenter first reminded them that
another subject was participating in the study at the same time. This
alleged person, always the same sex as the actual subject, was
12
an
presently completing the Initial stages of the experiment In
adjacent laboratory with another experimenter. A coat and knapsack
deposited conspicuously by one of the chairs suggested that the other
subject had left them, and would Indeed return later. On the table
were two note pads, two pens, and eight engaging wind-up toy animals
that subjects would presumably need for the task.
The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers proposed
to investigate how the presence of another person might Influence
performance. In each other's presence, but working independently,
each subject would be asked to write down ways to communicate
activities and concepts using the wind-up toys. For Instance,
subtraction might be shown by winding up several toys and allowing
them to hop away from the remaining toys. The experimenter Instructed
subjects to imagine trying to communicate an idea to a friend who
needed to understand the concept to pass an exam. Thus the
experimenter endeavored to convey that skill and creativity in
imparting Information, capacities manifested in good teachers, were
crucial to competence at this particular task.
At the experimenter's request, subjects first described in
writing both how competent they expected to be at this task and their
reasons for believing this. Secondly, they marked on a 15-polnt scale
how competent they expected to be at the task; this constituted the
measure of confidence. Finally, subjects received 12 cards with
competency-related adjectives printed on them, modeled after those
used by Erber and Flske (1984). The experimenter requested subjects
to use each adjective to write a self-descriptive statement reflecting
13
their standing on that adjective and whether it was app.icabie or not
to them, especially with regard to their work habits.
competition Manipulation. When subjects finished writing, the
experimenter proposed that, in addition to the mere presence of
another person, knowing something about that person might influence
performance on the task. Presumably to test this hypothesis, the
experimenter asked permission to exchange the information subjects had
Just written. To manipulate whether subjects competed or not, the
experimenter explained that $50 would be given to the subject who
performed best relative to his or her opponent, that is. for whom the
point gap between the two competitors was greatest. Noncompet i tors
were similarly told they might win $50. but their chances would be
randomly determined. The experimenter stressed that, although in the
same room, subjects were to work individually.^
After introducing the competition manipulation, the experimenter
excused herself, presumably to exchange the subjects' information.
She returned carrying a tape recorder and explained that the
researchers wished to record subjects' initial reactions to the
exchanged Information. After being reassured of the anonymity of
their responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other
subject, the experimenter asked subjects to read each piece of
information aloud and comment about it.
Expectancy Manipulation
. The fictitious other subject presumably
provided the same kind of information as the actual subject, and it
was this bogus information the subject received. In response to the
first question regarding competence at the task, the fictitious
subject In the positive expectation condition presumably wrote:
14
I think
1 might be pretty good at this. i 've been a
peer tutor for several years now. And 1 really like it.
In the negative expectation condition he or she wrote:
1
don't think I'll be very good at this.
I tried to be
a peer tutor once, but 1 wasn't very good at It.
Consistency of Informati on Manipulation
. The subsequent
information, supposedly the fellow subject's self-descriptive
statements, appeared in a different random order for each subject,
with the stipulation that no more than three consistent or three
Inconsistent statements appeared consecutively (see Appendix A).
Because half these statements suggested the fictitious subject was
competent at the task and the other half conveyed incompetency, the
statements were either consistent or inconsistent with the initial
expectat ion
.
When subjects finished commenting on the other subject's
activities, they completed a short questionnaire. On 15-polnt bipolar
scales, subjects rated how fun, likeable, creative, competent, and
good at the task the fictitious subject would be. Subjects also rated
their own competence a second time to assess whether their confidence
changed as a result of the manipulations, and also reported how
motivated they felt. Once this questionnaire was completed, subjects
were probed for suspicion, and debriefed. A random drawing for $50
was held when the study was completed.
Resu I ts
Prior to analyses, a median split of subjects' Initial ratings of
their own perceived competence at the task designated them as either
low- or high-confidence subjects. On the final questionnaire, high-
15
confidence subjects reported being
.ore motivated to perfor. the task
than did low-confidence subjects. F(1.36) - 4.78. p < .04.
T Imed At tent ion
From the audiotapes, the experimenter timed with a stopwatch the
number of seconds subjects considered each piece of Information.
Timing always commenced when subjects began to turn over the preceding
card. Which was clearly audible. The total number of seconds subjects
attended to consistent and Inconsistent information were entered Into
3 2X2X2X2 mixed-model analysis of variance, competition (yes.
no), by expectation (positive, negative) by subject-confidence (low.
high) by Information (consistent. Inconsistent). This analysis
yielded the predicted compet 1 t lon-by- I nformat Ion Interaction, F(l,36)
- 4.61. p < .04, Indicating that competitors Increased their attention
to Inconsistent information (see Figure 1).
Contrary to Initial predictions, however, competitors'
differential attention to Inconsistent Information did not Interact
with subject-confidence. Although the pattern of means was identical
at both levels of subject-confidence, it appeared more extreme for
high-confidence subjects. As an exploratory analysis, the data for
low- and high-confidence subjects were analyzed separately In 2 X 2 X
2 ANOVAs. The compet I t lon-by-informat Ion Interaction was significant
for high-confidence subjects, F(1,18) - 4.76, p < .04, but not
significant for low-confidence subjects, F(1,18) -
.66, p < .43.
Thus, It appears that the results depicted in Figure 1 are primarily a
consequence of the attention of high-confidence subjects, which
reflects predictions.
16
Attention to Positive an. Negative lnfnr..ti.n a I though pr imary
theoretical Interest lay with attention to expectancy-
I neons
. stent and
expectancy-consistent Information, competitors' and noncompet I tor s
'
attention to positive and negative Information (i.e. competency and
incompetency Information) may also be considered. The total number of
seconds subjects attended to positive and negative Information were
entered Into a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed-model analysis of variance,
competition (yes. no), by expectation (positive, negative) by subject-
confidence (low. high) by Information (positive, negative). A three-
way interaction between competition, expectation, and information.
F(1,36) = 4.61, p < .04. essentially paralleled the results obtained
when information was considered as consistent and Inconsistent. That
Is. relative to non-competitors, competitors expecting a competent
opponent sharply increased attention to negative information, whereas
competitors expecting an Incompetent opponent increased attention to
positive information.
Think-aloud Protocols
Subjects' tape-recorded comments were coded Into discrete
categories: Attribute Matching, Dispositional Comments. Elaborations.
Evaluations, Hedging, No Comments, Repetitions, and Self-References
(see Table 1). To assess reliability of the coding scheme, a second
individual coded a subset of the protocols. Interrater reliability on
code types, all significant at p < .001. ranged from r(26) = .70, to
£(26) = .89, with an average Interrater reliability of r = .84.
Interrater reliability for Dispositions was £(26) = .78. For each
comment type, the number of comments a subject made served as the
17
dependent variable entered into 2X2x?y9miv^i *i A *i X 2 X 2 mixed-model analyses of
variance, using the independent variables noted above.
Dispositional Comments
.
As originally anticipated. ANOVA yielded
a three-way interaction among competition, subject-confidence, and
information. F(1.36) = 7 59 n < ni ao • r-
'
'
' E ^ -01
•
As shown in Figure 2. the
comments of the high-confidence subjects clearly support the
hypotheses: Compet i tors generated more d i spos i t iona I inferences in
response to inconsistent information than did noncompet 1 tor s . For
low-confidence subjects, dispositional inferences about consistent and
inconsistent information did not vary as a function of competition.
Lower order effects revealed that high-confidence subjects
commented more about inconsistent information. F(l,36) = 6.81, p <
.01. and that, overall, competitors made more dispositional inferences
than noncompet i tors
.
F(1.36) = 4.81, p < .03.
Other Comments. High-confidence subjects were more lil<ely to
elaborate about expectancy-consistent information, whereas low-
confidence subjects elaborated about expectancy- i neons I stent
Information, F(1,36) = 4.80. p < .04. insofar as this result did not
Interact with the competition manipulation, it is difficult to
interpret from the current perspective.
Subjects were more iii<ely to make evaluations when not competing,
F(1.36) = 4.39. p < .04. and this was especially the case if subjects
expected to meet an incompetent other. F(1,36) = 5.26. p < .03.
Evaluation devoid of elaboration, dispositional inference, and other
more deliberative thought may reflect noncompet 1 tors ' preference to
move through the material quickly.
18
High-oonf.dence subjects «ere more likely to say "no comment," or
to look at an attribute without commenting about It than were low-
confidence subjects, F<1,36,
. 5.37, p < .03. Note that this does not
preclude spending time to consider the information, and perhaps
indicates censoring.
Adiierence to Expectancies
It was anticipated that competitors' resulting impressions,
assessed here by ratings of their opponent's overall competence, would
be more heterogeneous than noncompet
1 tors ' impressions. Because of
their perceived chance for success, this should be more true of high-
confidence subjects. An aggregate measure of subjects' perceptions of
the fictitious subject's competence was computed from three items on
the questionnaire: his or her creativity, competence, and likelihood
of being good at the task.
Homogeneity of variance tests between competitors and
noncompet
1 tors at each level of expectancy and subject-confidence were
conducted. For high-confidence subjects expecting to meet an
incompetent subject, the variability of ratings were greater for
competitors (SD = 10.38) than for noncompet i tor s (SD = 7.08), F(3,5) =
6.71. p < .03. Note that competitors in this condition should have
perceived the greatest likelihood of winning the prize, insofar as
generating a large point gap is easier when one faces an incompetent
rather than a competent opponent.
Still, for high-confidence subjects in general (i.e. collapsing
across expectations), there was a tendency for competitors' ratings
(SD = 7.23) to be more variable than noncompet 1 tor s ' ratings (SD =
4.91). F(9.11) - 2.17, p < .11. While these results provide limited
19
th
support for hypotheses, they should, of course, be Interpreted wl
caution due to small sample sizes. Because the assumption of
homogeneity of variance »as not met, the data from these questionnaire
Items were not subjected to additional analyses.
Summary and Conclusions
AS anticipated, relative to noncompet
i tors
. competitors increased
their attention to expectancy- Incons
I stent information. Separate
analyses indicate that, although patterns of attention were the same
for all subjects, primarily high-confidence subjects in competition
attended to inconsistent information. Moreover, only high-confidence
competitors i ncreased d I spos i t 1 ona
I Inferences about inconsistent
information. In all respects, their behavior substantiates the
hypotheses
.
Of course, low-confidence subjects could have formulated
dispositional inferences privately, without voicing them aloud; their
lack of confidence might have generalized to not voicing opinions.
Low-confidence subjects rarely refrained from commenting, however.
Though it is possible that low-confidence subjects did not utter their
true thoughts, a more parsimonious explanation is that low-confidence
competitors deemed It futile to size up an opponent when it was
relatively certain they would not win the prize.
High-confidence competitors, however, availed themselves of
opportunities to increase perceived control. Conceivably, any one of
various individual differences, such as self-esteem, prior experience
with psychology experiments, or Intelligence, might have fed Into
subjects' confidence In performing the task. In fact, confidence
could reflect individual differences in competitiveness (Kuhlman &
20
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o. 1975). Battistich and Aronoff (1985). for instance, found
that dominant individuals often anticipate success in competitions,
and that they even prefer competitive situations over cooperative
ones. High-confidence subjects were perhaps more competitive from the
onset. Whiie this explanation is intuitively appealing, there is no
independent empirical evidence suggesting that "sizing up opponents-
is especially prevalent among inherently competitive individuals, in
fact, because cooperative individuals expect variability in the types
of people they encounter, it has been suggested that they, not
competitive persons, would tend to seek information about others
(Kel ley & Stahelski
,
1970)
.
Nevertheless, the extent to which uncertainty about outcomes
accounts for the detected differences between high- and low-confidence
competitors remains open. Hence, rather than allow uncertainty to
vary according to pre-existing differences among subjects, uncertainty
Is held constant across subjects in Experiment 2. In the second
experiment, all subjects are led to expect their own performance to be
average, while the fictitious subject's competence is portrayed as
slightly superior or slightly inferior to their own. This creates
similar degrees of uncertainty about the outcome for all subjects; all
competitors could lose the competition by dropping their guard or
could win through increased vigilance. Thus attention to and
dispositional inferences in response to inconsistencies are
potentially adaptive strategies for all competitors.
21
1 lOr
Competition
Consistent
—^Inconsistent
Bonferroni t-tests assessed differences among means.
Means not sharing a common subscript differ at p < .05.
Figure 1, Competitors' and Noncompetitors ' Attention
Inconsistent and Consistent Information.
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Table 1. Content Categories for Comments About Target's Attributes.
Category
Attr Ibute Match
D I spos 1 1 iona
I
E I aborat ion/ Interpretation
Eva iuat ions
Hedg 1 ng
No comment
Repet 1 1 ions/parapl^ rasing
Se I f-ref erence
Exp
I anat ion
Information matched to prior
knowledge of target: e.g. other
attributes, expectancy.
Statement about target's traits,
tendencies,
I ii<es.
Attempt to interpret what
information means or its
Imp I i cat ions.
Eva Iuat ion wi thout interpretation
Comment not directed at anything
part icular
.
Fills in pauses with
"we I I uh."
No comment made or subject
says "no comment .
"
Repeat verbatim or paraphrase.
Self comparisons, reference
to se I f
,
op i n 1 ons
.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Over V I ew
In an experimental situation similar to that In Experiment 1,
subjects expected to compete or not compete with another subject who
was apt to be either slightly better or slightly worse at the task
than themselves. In addition to expectancy-consistent and expectancy-
Inconsistent information, subjects also read task- 1 r re 1 evant
Information about the fictitious fellow subject. To the extent that
competitors' goals are to assess an opponent's task ability, task-
irrelevant information is of I im 1 ted ut 1 I i ty . Hence, competitors
should attend little to and rarely comment about task- 1 r re I evant
Information. However, in the event competitors do consider task-
Irrelevant information, it might be for the purpose of derogation.
In either event, Inconsistent information again should be
preferred by competitors. In favor of other types of information.
Planned orthogonal comparisons tested how attention to and
dispositional comments about the three types of information differed
at the two levels of competition.
Sub Jects
Thirty-two female and 8 male undergraduates at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst received credit in their psychology course
4
and were promised an opportunity to win a $15 prize. Subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions, with
equal proportions of males and females in each condition. No
25
discernable sex differences were found. The data of three women who
were suspicious about the procedures were omitted from ail analyses,
as were the data of one woman who comprehended English poorly.^
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, subjects expected to meet a fellow subject of
the same sex who had already begun the initial stages of the
experiment in an adjacent lab. Again, the cover story involved the
investigation of how the presence of another person might affect
performance on a tasl<.
A recreational game using the wind-up toys was described as
follows. Sitting across a table from each other, but working
individually, the two subjects would have exactly twenty minutes to
write down ways to demonstrate various simple ideas and concepts,
using the wind-up toys as props. Once subjects thoroughly understood
the game and scoring, they completed a brief practice trial to give
them "hands on" experience with the game.
In order to manipulate subjects' confidence in playing the game,
the experimenter told subjects that competence and scores at a certain
brief game were excellent predictors of competence and scores at the
twenty-minute game they would play with the fictitious subject. She
asked subjects to locate words at least 4 letters long hidden in the
names of the wind-up toy animals. For example, in 'orange boxing
kangaroo' can be found the words 'king' and 'brink.' After counting
the number of words subjects found, the experimenter told them "that's
about how most people have been doing." After making some bogus
calculations, all subjects learned that they could expect to obtain
26
between 22 and 27 points In the 20 minute game, again described as
"about how most people have been doing." The experimenter wrote this
predicted range on a slip of paper, and then asked subjects to write
their first names above their predicted scores.
The experimenter reminded subjects that, on their statements of
Informed consent, they agreed to provide information about themselves.
She gave subjects 15 cards with bipolar adjective pairs printed on
them. On each card, subjects circled the word that best described
them, and wrote an idiosyncratic example of how it applied to them.
When subjects finished writing, the experimenter proposed to exchange
subject information, according to procedures reported in Experiment 1.
Competition Manipulation
. To manipulate whether subjects
expected to compete or not. the experimenter announced that subjects
could win one of two $15 prizes. In the competition condition,
subjects discovered that their performance relative to their
opponents' performance determined their chance to win a prize.
Subjects wrote their names on a raffle ticket with space provided for
both subjects' names, telephone numbers, and scores. The experimenter
explained that If that ticket was drawn in the raffle, the subject who
had obtained the higher score would receive $15. She further
indicated that, if scores were equal at the end of the game, a tie
breaking question would be Introduced.
In the no-compet 1 t Ion condition, subjects learned of a random
drawing for a $15 prize for subjects who began in the first lab. and a
separate random drawing for subjects who began In the fictitious
second lab. The experimenter explicitly told subjects that
27
individuals participating in the study s imu i taneous
I y couid each win a
$15 prize, subjects wrote their names, telephone numbers, and iab
room number on a raffle ticket. After introducing the competition
manipulation, the experimenter exited a second time, allegedly to
exchange subjects' information. in the competition condition, she
took the raffle ticket "for the other subject to complete." whereas in
the no-competition condition, the experimenter intimated that she
would place the ticket in the appropriate raffle box.
Expectanc y Man i pu I at ion . Before returning to the lab. the
experimenter randomly determined whether the Imaginary subject would
be portrayed as slightly superior or slightly inferior to the actual
subject. The predicted scores for the slightly superior and slightly
Inferior fellow subject ranged from 24-29 and 20-25, respectively.
Both ranges overlapped somewhat with the subjects' predicted score
range. Pretesting of these ranges indicated that for people expecting
to obtain between 22-27 points, the perceived likelihood of scoring
higher than a superior and an inferior person was approximately 41%
and 63%, respect i ve
I
y
.
Upon returning with the fictitious subject's cards, the
experimenter produced a previously hidden tape recorder and explained
that subjects' initial reactions to the exchanged information would be
recorded. She explained that tape-recording would be more accurate
than the experimenter taking notes, and that It could capture the
spontaneity of subjects' comments. After reassuring subjects of the
anonymity of their responses, especially with respect to their fellow
28
subject, the experimenter asked subjects to read each card aloud and
comment about It.
Consistency of Informat ion Manipulation
. The first piece of
information always contained the fictitious subject's name (Mike or
Anne) and his or her predicted score range (20-25 or 24-29. depending
on the expectation), with those exceptions. Identical cards appeared
across conditions. The adjectives supposedly chosen by the fictitious
other subject, and his or her examples, were pretested so that one-
third of the cards Implied competency at the game, one-third implied
Incompetency, and one-third were task- I r re I evant and neutral with
respect to competency (see Appendix B). For subjects expecting to
meet an Inferior subject. Incompetency Information was consistent with
this expectation whereas competency Information was inconsistent, and
vice versa if the fictitious subject was apparently superior. Each
subject saw a different sequence of cards, random except for the
stipulation that no more than two competency, two Incompetency, or two
task-Irrelevant Information cards appeared consecutively.
When subjects finished commenting on the fictitious subject's
Information, they completed a short questionnaire assessing their own
expected competence and motivation levels, as well as how likable,
fun. good at the game, and competent they perceived their fellow
subject to be. All questions were presented along 15-polnt bipolar
sea les
.
Although subjects In the no-compet 1 t Ion condition were not
explicitly instructed to compete, and although the reward structure
did not require competition, noncompet I tors might have conceivably
29
competed for the higher score. Consequently, the questionnaire
contained an item concerning the extent to which subjects wouid like
to beat the other subject's score.
After subjects completed the questionnaire, the experimenter
probed subjects for suspicion, and thoroughly debriefed them. At the
conclusion of the study, a random drawing was held to award a $15
pr i ze
.
Resu I ts
Man I pu I at ion Checl<s
Data used for the manipulation checks were entered into 2X2
analyses of variance, competition (yes, no) by expectation (superior,
inferior). Subjects rated the fictitious subject as likely to be
better at the task when expecting a superior rather than an Inferior
fellow subject, F(1,32) = 6.72, p < .01.
Apparently, subjects accepted their predicted score range
computed by the experimenter. Self-reported score estimates did not
differ significantly from 22 or 27. which were the extremes of the
predicted score range, nor from 24.5. which was the mean of the
predicted score range. In addition, differences in self-reported
competence as a function of the manipulations were not detected.
Because the fictitious subject was portrayed as only slightly
Inferior or slightly superior to actual subjects, it is worth
considering whether or not subjects perceived any appreciable
dissimilarity In ability. The algebraic difference between subjects'
estimates of their own scores and their estimates for the fictitious
subject were computed; these data did not meet assumptions of
30
homogeneity of variance, and were therefore not analyzed. The
difference between subjects' self-reported competence and ratings of
the fictitious subject's competence met this assumption, however.
ANOVA revealed no significant effects, suggesting that subjects
accepted that their own ability was similar to that of the fictitious
subject
.
Relative to noncompet
1
tors
,
subjects in the competition condition
did not report a greater desire to beat the fictitious other subject's
score, F(1,32) = 1.11. p < .30. It is possible, of course, that
subjects' responses may have been influenced by information about the
target person, as well as by each manipulation itself. For example,
competitors who concluded that the opponent would be a formidable
adversary could have decided that they did not truly wish to win (i.e.
sour grapes). Alternatively, for reasons of social desirability,
competitors might not have accurately reported their desire to win.
T Imed Attent ion
Attention was assessed as in Experiment 1. The total number of
seconds subjects looked at consistent, inconsistent, and tasl<-
irrelevant information was entered into a 2 X 2 X 3 mixed-model
analysis of variance, competition (yes, no), by expectation (superior,
inferior) by information (consistent, inconsistent, irrelevant).
ANOVA yielded a main effect of information, F(2.64) = 4.19. p < .02.
qualified by a significant compet i t ion-by- 1 nformat ion interaction,
F(2,64) = 4.02, p < .02. As shown in Figure 3a. while competitors
increased attention to inconsistent information, noncompet i tor s tended
to increase attention to consistent information. Finally, relative to
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noncompeting subjects, competitors reduced attention to task-
irrelevant information.
Because primary theoretical Interest lay with attention to
consistent and inconsistent information as a function of competition,
the data for task- 1 r re I evant information were omitted from a second
analysis. The compet i t ion-by- i nformat ion interaction, without task-
irrelevant information, is by itself significant. F(1.32) = 4.34. p <
.05.
The two degrees of freedom associated with the compet 1 t ion-by-
Information interaction allowed two a priori contrasts. It was
anticipated that competitors, relative to noncompet 1 tors
. would favor
inconsistent information over other types of information. A contrast
comparing attention to inconsistent information with the average of
attention to consistent and task- 1 r re 1 evant Information confirmed this
prediction, F(1,32) = 6.74, p < .01.
The second contrast tested the prediction that, compared to
noncompet i tors, competitors would attend to task-relevant (i.e.
consistent and inconsistent) Information longer than to task-
irrelevant information. This contrast, in the expected direction,
approached significance, F(1,32) = 3.55, p < .07.
Attention to Positive, Negative, and Neutral Information . The
number of seconds competitors and noncompet 1 tors attended to positive,
negative, and neutral information were entered into a 2 X 2 X 3 ANOVA,
competition (yes, no) by expectation (superior, inferior) by
Information (positive, negative, neutral). The three-way Interaction
among these variables was marginally significant, F(2,64) = 2.91,
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P < .06. Relative to noncompet
I tor s . who attended equally to all
types Of information, when expecting to meet a superior other
competitors tended to drop their attention to all but negative
information (I.e. Inconsistent Information), m contrast, relative to
noncompet! tors anticipating an Incompetent other, competitors sharply
Increased attention to positive Information (I.e. Inconsistent
Information), but continued attending to negative Information (i.e.
consistent Information).
For competitors anticipating a superior opponent, negative
information affords the only glimmer of hope for success; it may be
that they fixated on this Information to the exclusion of other
Information because It alone Increases predictability. m contrast,
for competitors anticipating an Inferior opponent, negative
information continues to be attended to. perhaps due to wishful
thinking. However, because they are motivated to be accurate and
enhance predictability, competitors In this condition need to (and do)
tal<e positive information Into account.
Think-aloud Protocols
As In Experiment 1, subjects' tape-recorded comments were content
coded (see Table 1), with a second individual coding a subset of the
protocols. Interrater reliability on comment types ranged from r(18)
- .68, p < .002, to r(18) - .93, p < .001. The latter correlation
represents interrater reliability on dispositional comments. On the
average, Interrater reliability was r_ - .83. p < .001. For each
comment type, the number of comments a subject made was entered Into a
2X2X3 ANOVAS, using the Independent variables noted above.
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Dispositional Comments. ANOVA revealed a main effect of
information. F(2.64)
= 3.45. p < .04. clarified by a significant
compet ition-by-informat ion Interaction. F(2.64) = 3.34. p < .04 (see
Figure 3b). As with timed attention, upon excluding task- I r re i evant
information, the Interaction of interest remains significant. F(1.32)
- 7.88. p < .008. Competitors made dispositional comments in response
to Inconsistent information, whereas noncompet 1 tors made dispositional
comments about consistent Information.
The contrasts performed on timed attention were also performed on
dispositional comments, with identical predictions. The contrast
comparing dispositional comments about Inconsistent information with
the average number of dispositional comments made about consistent and
taslc-irrelevant information confirmed predictions. F(1.32) = 7.00, p <
.01. The second contrast, that competitors would make more
dispositional inferences about task-relevant than task-Irrelevant
Information, was not significant, F(1.32) =
.24, p < .63.
Other Comments
.
Hedging was less frequent In the competition
condition. F(1,32) = 6.62, p < .01. in fact, subjects expecting to
compete with a less competent opponent hedged very little. F(1.32) -
4.40, p < .04. Hedging was defined as uttering words with no evident
meaning, filling in gaps between actual comments, as if searching for
a comment to make. Competitors, then, apparently did not need to
search for something to say. As reflected in the patterns of "No
comments." competitors either made a meaningful comment about an
attribute, or skipped that attribute entirely.
34
subjects primarily declined to comment about Inconsistent
Information, F(2.64) = 4 r7 n ^ m ti,i
_^ .04; 4.87. p < .01. This result Is explained by the
competltlon-by-lnformatlon Interaction. F(2.64) = 3.83. p < .03.
Noncompetitors refrained from commenting mostly about Inconsistent
Information, whereas competitors refrained from commenting on
consistent Information. Though not explicitly predicted, this result
is not surprising. Because consistent Information would be less
useful to competitors, they apparently skipped over It. In contrast,
noncompetitors appeared unwilling to exert effort to reconcile
inconsistencies, which would be expected for individuals using more
expectancy-based processes In Impression formation.
Derogat Ion
Although collapsed in the analyses above, the valence of each
comment was noted on dispositional, elaboratlve, and evaluative
comments. The number of positive, negative, and non-valenced comments
subjects made were first summed, and then submitted to ANOVAs.
Analysis of negative comments about task- i r re i evant Information
revealed a non-s
i
gn I f
I cant effect of competition In the expected
direction, F(1,32) = 1.76, p < .19, namely that competitors would tend
to make more derogatory comments. In addition, no differences In
reported liking for the fictitious subject were reported on the
questionnaire. Thus there is little support for hypotheses about
derogat Ion
.
Adherence to Expectancies
As in Experiment 1, it was predicted that competitors' ratings of
their opponents' competency might be more variable than
35
noncompet iters' ratings. For the simple questions concerning the
fictitious subject's competence at the task and likelihood of being
good at the task, nor the aggregate measure of the two. homogeneity of
variance tests revealed no significant differences In variability.
However, considerable variability was detected among estimates of
the fellow subject's final score in the game, which was the actual
expectation. The homogeneity of variance test revealed significantly
more variability In competitors' estimates (SD - 7.30) than
noncompet I tors' estimates (SD - 4.83). F(17.17) - 2.23. p < .05.
suggesting that competitors vary considerably In their final
assessments of opponents.
36
C5
CD
£
o
O
lo CM n
o) o t>~
<D CO (D
a
e
o
O
I £0 W <D O O C 03
4J
3
0
td
(U
u
C
<u
v-i
01
In
rH
C3
C
0
•H
•H
C/3
0
CX
U3
•H
•n
c
C3 •
c
0 0
4-1 •H
4-)
c Cl
0 6
•H
•U 0
c M-l
c
w
•u
<: 4-1
C
>
1-1
0 rH
VJ OJ
•H
U ^-1
OJ •H
Oh 1
6
0
u
c H
0
2: TJ
C
•0 03
c
4J
c
tfi
J-i 4-1
0 c/:
4-1 •H
•H
4-)
0)
e
0 •\
u 4J
c
4J
CO y)
•H
a' CO
u
3 0
O) u
•H
37
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The results of both experiments suggest that competing
individuals attend to and make dispositional inferences about
information inconsistent with initial expectations about opponents, at
least in situations in which there is a reasonable chance of success.
Of special importance is the increase in attention, a necessary
condition for more individuating processes. Moreover, as shown by the
Increased variability of competitors' resulting impressions, attention
apparently leads competitors to rely less heavily on prior
expectanc i es
.
The consequences of uncertainty regarding the outcome of a
competition generalized across the two experiments. In Experiment 1,
In which uncertainty varied naturally, individuating processes (i.e.
increased attention to and dispositional Inferences about
Inconsistencies, and more varied resulting impressions) were most
pronounced for competitors in the conditions in which the outcome was
uncertain (i.e. for high-confidence competitors). And, when
uncertainty was Independent of subject variables in Experiment 2, such
individuating processes were manifested again.
An Interesting difference between the results of the two
experiments is that, in Experiment 1, attention to consistent
Information changed little as a function of competition. This result
agrees with previous findings on attention and consistency of
Information (Erber & Fislce, 1984; Neuberg & Fisl<e, 1987). suggesting
38
that expectancy-consistent information does not cease to be used, but
merely decreases in importance (see Fiske & Neuberg, in press).
In Experiment 2, however, competitors actually decreased
attention to consistent Information, a result which had not initially
been anticipated. These competitors apparently chose to ignore
consistent information and focus almost exclusively on
inconsistencies. In addition, competitors frequently refrained from
commenting about consistent information. Perhaps competitors felt
compelled to be particularly discriminating in attending to opponent
information, because a competition with an opponent of equal ability
Is the epitome of an uncertain situation.
Expectancy-based to Attribute-based Impressions
This finding is not, however, entirely inconsistent with the
results of Experiment 1, nor with Flske and Neuberg's (in press)
continuum model of Impression formation. In both Experiments,
noncompet 1 tors tended to favor consistent information over
Inconsistent Information, with the converse being true for
compet 1 tors
.
According to Flske and Neuberg's continuum model, individuals
operate as "cognitive misers," preferring to form the simplest
coherent impression that will serve present purposes. The simplest
Impressions available to noncompet I tors were those based exclusively
on the expectation; due to nondependence
.
pure expectancy-based
Impressions would be preferable. Perhaps left to their own devices,
noncompet 1 tor s would have accepted the expectancy at face value, by
not even glancing at the fictitious subject's attribute Information.
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However, the experimental situation demanded noncompet
i tor s to read
the information; in effect, noncompet i tor s were instructed to attend
to the other person.
Even When given some motivation to attend, individuals continue
to function as cognitive misers, expending as little energy as
possible to form an impression. if an individual chooses to attend to
a target, the simplest strategy is to attempt to reconfirm
expectations (Fiske and Neuberg. in press), a task most easily
completed by attention to expectancy-consistent information. And it
was indeed to expectancy-consistent information, the stuff that
stereotypes are made on, that noncompet i tors primarily attended. Thus
noncompet! tors' efforts to reconfirm the expectation could account for
their relatively greater attention to expectancy-consistent
Informat Ion.
Of course, competitors also sought Impressions sufficient for
their present purposes, although their purposes were to predict the
opponent and to win the competition. Impressions suited to these
purposes required more effort of competitors, hence their relatively
greater attention to expectancy- 1 neons I stent Information, in
Experiment 2, Increased effort In forming an Impressions is reflected
in competitors virtually ignoring the easily Integrated expectancy-
consistent Information. It Is almost as if competitors bet against
the accuracy of their prior expectancies. if a prior expectancy may
be construed as a hypothesis, competitors in Experiment 2 subjected
that hypothesis to a most rigorous testing.
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Intergroup Versus Int erpersonal Competition
This paper opened with an apparent paradox: predictions from the
desegregation literature seemed to contradict predictions from
Interdependence theory, from the Impression formation literature, as
well as from our own intuitions. Despite the slight difference
between the two experiments, the results as a whole suggest that
Impression formation in a competing dyad is not what literature about
competing groups may have initially suggested. There are several
reasons why differences in impression formation might exist. First,
and most obviously, when an individual joins fellow group members to
compete as a team, rather than being one half of an isolated dyad in
competition, group membership is lil<ely to be salient. And, as a
function of Gestait principles such as proximity, similarity and
common fate, each individual is construed as a part of that group
(Brown & Turner
, 1981 )
.
Second, opportunities to attend to a particular opponent's
Individual attributes are considerably diminished by group
competition; contact with out-group members Is probably brief and
Infrequent. As a result. It is less Nicely that individuating
Information about an individual will be noted and Integrated into
impressions. Although members of a competing dyad may compete once,
and once only, for the duration of the competition the two are close
contact with one another. Merely by dint of this contact.
Individuating Information has an increased probability of being
not 1 ced
.
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Third, although competing groups are Interdependent. Individual
members of each particular group are Interdependent upon one another.
That Is. In addition to competitive Interdependence between groups,
individuals are cooperatively Interdependent upon teammates within
their in-group. These two simultaneous
i nter dependent I es create two
possible foci Of attention: Members of the out-group, and the members
of the In-group. Frequent and long term contact is likely more to be
prevalent among in-group members, factors which often serve to
heighten Interdependence (Kelley & Thibaut. 1978). indeed, people are
less likely to individuate members of an out-group than members of the
In-group. People construe the out-group as more homogeneous, tending
to be less favorably disposed toward them (see Brewer. 1979; Mullen &
Hu, In press; Turner. 1981 for reviews). Possibly, competition
between groups reduces attention to out-group members In favor of
attention to in-group members.
When two Individuals compete one-on-one. however, the salient
Interdependence Is the competitive one. Even though each Individual
may remain part of a larger group, and continue to Identify with that
group, neither individual directly depends on the behaviors or
outcomes of in-group members for success in the competition. Thus
competing Individuals shou I
d
attend to one another, and as a
consequence, their Impressions can become less expectancy-based.
Doubtless, however, a direct comparison of impression formation during
Intergroup competition with impression formation during interpersonal
competition Is needed to fill the empirical gaps.
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Frequently, categories such as race. sex. or religious
affiliation serve as expectancies In Intergroup and interpersonal
encounters. Although the expectancies employed In this Investigation
were not social categories of this type, attention to expectancy-
inconsistent information during Interpersonal compet I t i ve s I tuat Ions
Should generalize to such categories. More to the point, implicit in
many social categories are expectations of competence in particular
domains. A woman, for example, might be stereotyped as competent at
certain activities, but as incompetent at others. Interpersonal
competition demands her opponent to attend to information Inconsistent
with the female stereotype. Information that might remain unnoticed in
an Intergroup competition, or in nondependent situations.
Unfortunately, well defined expectancies, such as domains of
competence Inherent In gender-role stereotypes, are resistant to
change. Having engaged in interpersonal competition. Individuals may
not be stereotyped by their opponents, which is generally a positive
consequence. However, a single, isolated Incident of competing
against one category member is unlikely to lead individuals to modify
or discard their stereotypes of the entire group. Indeed, the very
task orientation of a competitive encounter may work against this (cf.
Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985). Thus those same Individuals who
cease to stereotype their opponent will continue to stereotype other
members of their opponent's category. Any positive effects of
Interpersonal competition may therefore be limited to the individuals
I nvo I ved
,
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Task-Re I evancv nf i nformation Att^nH^H
The results of this Investigation may diverge from results
implied by the intergroup competition literature for reasons other
than, or In addition to. the distinction between Intergroup and
interpersonal competition. Although competitors attend primarily to
inconsistent information, certain attributes are relatively more
important than others. Specifically, attention to information
pertinent to the task potentially offers the best opportunity to
enhance perceived control over outcomes. in these two experiments,
the attributes competitors attended to most were both expectancy-
Inconsistent and relevant to the task.
To the extent that expectancy-inconsistent, task-relevant
Information is attended to most, competitors conceivably Individuate
each other primarily along task-relevant dimensions, but continue to
stereotype each other along task-Irrelevant dimensions. For example,
an American Olympic skater might individuate her Soviet opponent with
respect to skill, confidence, and experience at their event,
construing her as distinct from other Soviet skaters. However, she
may continue to stereotype that opponent along other dimensions by
falling to reconcile emergent inconsistencies in task- i r re I evant
attributes (e.g. along a social dimension).
Conceivably, intergroup competitors also individuate out-group
members along task-relevant but not along task-irrelevant dimensions.
Indeed, it is feasible that if Intergroup competition researchers
distinguished between task-relevant and task- i r re I evant information,
findings would be comparable to those of the current investigation.
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Differential Individuation along task-relevant and task-
Irrelevant dimensions may reflect a critical difference between
competitive and cooperative interdependence. As noted earlier,
cooperators generally regard each other more positively than
competitors. As cooperators facilitate each other's goals, enough
positive affect might develop along task-re i evant dimensions to carry
over to other dimensions. Moreover, cooperation affords opportunities
for Individuation along other dimensions. For example, members of a
team may take a coffee break together long enough to begin
Individuating along task- 1 r re I evant dimensions.
This does not mean competitors cannot Individuate along task-
Irrelevant dimensions. instead, cooperation perhaps facilitates a
more generalized Individuation whereas competition presents obstacles
to such Individuation. For instance. Tesser (1988) demonstrated that.
In order to maintain self-esteem, individuals derogated a close other
who was skilled in their favored activity. Analogously, if a
competitive task Is equally Important to the competitors, it may be
difficult for friendship, which ilkeiy involves individuation along
task-Irrelevant dimensions, to form.^
Frequently, people seek out competition for pure enjoyment, or to
test their skills. In addition, goal structures in various real world
Interpersonal situations (e.g. athletics, obtaining employment,
prosecution versus defense lawyers) often are inherently competitive.
As a result of such Interpersonal competition, individuals may form
more Individuated Impressions of each other than they might otherwise.
Recognition of another's competence, which may be inconsistent with an
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expectancy or stereotype, „ay even decrease discrimination at least
along that dimension. However, It is not the Intention here to offer
competition as the desired alternative to cooperation, instead, it ,s
to suggest that, where it exists, interpersonal competition may have
some beneficial, previously uninvestigated consequences.
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APPENDIX A
St Imul
I for Exper Iment 1
My boss thinks I'm pretty conscientious.
I try to be thorough and cover everything
i should.
1
think I make pretty efficient use of my time.
People say I seem relaxed when I speak in class.
I'm persistent In tackling problems.
Most of the time 1 get things done quickly.
I can be pretty irresponsible at times.
I've been told I can be kind of superficial in my work.
My thoughts seem a bit fuzzy when I write them down.
I'm a bit sloppy and my work suffers. Sometimes.
Yesterday a friend told me 1 was nitpicking.
Once in a while 1 argue a petty point.
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APPENDIX B
St imul
i for Exper iment 2
HoPPy
-
NO. Sloppy. My handwriting Is MIeglble, so , have ,o prin,,
^thlngl'^'"" ' °' ' try ,o explain
— ho^orr- " ''''' '° ^ -"-'^'on a.ou,
'"''''Trill-.:SS onl - - - -
"""??ea.S^- ' °" '
Clever:
-
Not Clever. I'm quick with a pun or a clever comeback.
Unobservant
- Observant.
I notice the crucial clues In mystery/detective shows.
Smart
- Not Smart. I usually get good grades; my GPA Is Important to
- Not Persistent.
I like puzzles and brain teasers youhave to work hard at
.
^^^'^'Q^^
- Not Efficient. l manage my time well, usually get
homework done way ahead of time.
Friendly
- Unfriendly.
I like to spend time alone sometimes, so some
people think I'm unfriendly.
Noisy
- Not noisy. People can usually hear me coming down the hall.
Sympathet Ic - Unsympathetic. I really should've done work last night,
but my roommate needed to talk.
Romant ic
- Unromantic. The other night we shared a banana split for
two
.
Unkind - Kind
.
We can't keep pets, but I've been feeding a stray dog
I ate I y
.
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ENDNOTES
competition conCtLs we^r::::::^^ra^al^^L'"' °'
"°
.ore H.ely ,n ^hrZJJtlU^^Jul rr^^:™':^
competition condition, or equally likely' in PMcoio' WInnlnathe prize seemed an equally likely outcome In both condl?lons,Tt)'.
3. Several other significant Interactions, theoretically
uninteresting, are not discussed here. For example, target
nforma on may be viewed as conveying competency and incompetencynformat on as well expectancy- consistent and expectancy-
'
nconsis ent Information. Interactions Involving the expectation andn ormatlon d rectly reflect this, and were found for DIs ostnons£(1,36) - 11.12, p < .002, Repetitions. F(1,36) . 20.64 p < 0001
n 36V°"!'7l'''''* an^ Attrlbuie cimL ts
•
F(1, 6) - 4.74, p < .0360.
Three-way interactions between competition, expectation and
subject-confidence were found for the dependent variables Time F(1 36)
- 4.12, p < .05, Dispositional comments, F(1,36) = 8.00, p < .OOVe'andHedging, F(1,36) = 7.98. p < .008. Because these were thi between
subjects variables, means are based on only 4 to 6 subjects per ce i i
and one is reluctant to draw conclusions about such results.
4. During Experiment 1 debriefing, subjects occasionally commented
that $50 seemed like a lot of money. In lieu of budget constraints
the amount of the prizes were reduced for Experiment 2.
5. Of subjects whose data were omitted from analyses. 3 were from the
no competition-positive expectation condition and 1 from the
competition-positive expectation condition.
6. This is perhaps one reason why. In Experiment 2. competitors did
not derogate their opponents. Not only were competitors strangers,
but It Is unlilcely that competence at that particular task was central
to the i r ident 1 1 ies.
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